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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For seven consecutive years, the Mercer Law Review has been kind
enoughto ask the author to review Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions.
While one may question the wisdom of the Review's annual return to the
same well, seven years of reading every Eleventh Circuit decision involving evidentiary issues has allowed the author to note what may loosely be
called "trends" in the Eleventh Circuit's decisions. No claim can be made
that these observations are based on statistical or empirical data; they
derive solely from the author's sense of the Eleventh Circuit's direction
and predilections over the past seven years.
First, it seems that Federal Rule of Evidence 403, once a frequent determinative in appeals, has all but disappeared from the Eleventh Circuit's lexicon. Rule 403 permits a trial court to exclude evidence under
certain circumstances, most notably when the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Rule 403 determinations are necessarily fact specific and, like all evidentiary determinations, are governed by the abuse of discretion standard.' Consequently,
it would seem that the circumstances under which an appellate court
would reverse a district court's Rule 403 determination would be rare.
This, however, happened frequently in the mid and late 1980s. In more
recent survey years, however, this has happened rarely, if at all.
In what is perhaps a related "trend", the level of scrutiny in Rule
404(b) determinations has decreased. Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission
of extrinsic act evidence to prove a person's propensity to act in a particular way but allows such evidence for other purposes, "such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of
* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
College (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cure laude, 1981). Member,

State Bar of Georgia.
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See United States v. Sans, 731 F.2d 1521, 1532 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
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mistake or accident."2 Although a trend with regard to Rule 404(b) has
not been as marked as the disappearance of Rule 403, the Eleventh Circuit generally seems to be much more deferential to trial court determinations admitting extrinsic act evidence.
Another area of evidence law which has seen marked change in the last
seven years is the interplay of hearsay evidence and the confrontation
clause of the United States Constitution. As discussed below, the constitutional limitations on the use of hearsay evidence have been, as the result more of Supreme Court decisions than Eleventh Circuit decisions,
substantially relaxed.
Finally, these three specific "trends" may be related to an apparent
decrease in the number of appeals in which evidentiary issues are determinative. One could conclude that the Eleventh Circuit, perhaps because
of an increased case load, is focusing less on procedural and evidentiary
issues and more on substantive issues.

II. RULE 103.

RULINGS ON EVIDENCE

Typically, the Eleventh Circuit takes literally the requirement of Rule
103 that a party timely object to a ruling admitting evidence and the
somewhat less well-known requirement, in the case of a ruling excluding
evidence, that the party proffering the evidence make an offer of proof.
Without making an offer of proof, a party cannot successfully appeal a
district court's ruling excluding evidence unless the district court committed "plain error." In United States v. Mitchell,' however, the Eleventh
Circuit took what some may consider a remarkably tolerant view of an
appealing party's lax observance of the requirements of Rule 103. In
Mitchell the district court excluded expert testimony that the government intended to use at trial. Apparently, the government made an offer
of proof of sorts, but the record on appeal did not include this offer or
defendant's arguments on a motion to exclude the testimony.5 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged it was bound by the abuse of discretion standard in determining whether evidence had been improperly excluded.' The court continued, however, that for it to hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion "in the absence of a detailed and reported proffer by the Government, we would have to conclude that the
precluded testimony could under no circumstances have been admissi2., FED. R. EVID.
3. FED. R. EVID.
1990), discussed in
4. 954 F.2d 663
5. Id. at 665.
6. Id.

404(b).
103(d); see also United States v. West, 898 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERcER L. REv. 1451, 1452 (1991).
(11th Cir. 1992).
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ble."' In other words, if the testimony would have been admissible under
any conceivable scenario, then the district court's order must be vacated.
Not surprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit found it could not "reach this categorical conclusion." First, because it could not "eliminate the possibility
that [the expert] testimony might assist the jury," the Eleventh Circuit
could not conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying upon Rule 702 to exclude the testimony.9 Second, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it could affirm the district court's reliance upon Rule
403 to exclude the testimony only if it
found that there exists no possible trial scenario in which the probative
value of this testimony would not be "substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'
Again, the Eleventh Circuit was not prepared to make such a conclusion.
The irony of Mitchell is manifest. In a typical case, the abuse of discretion standard is a difficult standard to meet. In Mitchell the government
compounded its burden by failing to make proper arrangements for the
preparation of a record of its offer of proof. For this precise reason, however, the government enjoyed a standard of review on appeal that would
have been difficult not to satisfy. As a practice pointer, do not rely upon
Mitchell to avoid the consequences of an inadequate or unreported offer
of proof. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order "with the
instruction [to the district court] to conduct an adequate hearing on defendants' preclusion motions in the presence of a court reporter,", which
suggests that the goal may have been to chastise the district court rather
than to benefit the government.
III. RULE 106.

REMAINDER OF OR RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED
STATEMENTS

Rule 106, sometimes called the "rule of completeness," permits a party
to insist on the introduction of an entire document when the adverse
party has introduced only a portion of the document.12 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Myers 3 demonstrates that this rule is
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id. (quoting FED. R. Evt. 403).
Id. at 667-68,
FED. R. EviD. 106.
972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992).
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not without limitations. In Myers the government introduced a portion of
defendant's pretrial statement to impeach a specific point of his trial testimony. Defendant then moved for the introduction of the entire statement, a request denied by the district court."' Although acknowledging
Rule 106, the Eleventh Circuit held that the remaining portions of the
statement were irrelevant to the government's impeachment effort. 15 Because the remainder of the statement was not explanatory or relevant to
the portion introduced by the government, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion. 16
IV.

RULE

301.

PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND
PROCEEDINGS

Although not mentioned expressly in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
federal courts presume receipt of properly mailed documents. In In re
East Coast Brokers & Packer, Inc.,1 appellant sought to maintain possession of commodities shipped to appellant by appellee, who subsequently filed bankruptcy. Appellant relied upon the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act,'9 which allows a commodity merchant, dealer, or
broker to maintain possession of goods and to hold these goods in trust
for the benefit of unpaid suppliers or sellers.2 0 However, the parties seeking to maintain possession of the goods must provide written notice to the
shipper of their intent to hold the goods.2 1 Appellant contended that appellee received timely notice, but appellee denied receiving this notice.
However, the Department of Agriculture received copies of the notices,
which showed appellee's accurate address. The trial court refused to employ the presumption of receipt of properly mailed documents and, therefore, found appellant did not demonstrate timely mailing of the requisite
notices. 22
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.2 8 The Eleventh Circuit noted
that a party relying upon the presumption must first show that the document was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed.2' Appellant attempted to establish these elements through the testimony of its general
14.

Id. at 1575.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17.

Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932).

18. 961 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1992).
19.

7 U.S.C. §§ 499a-s (1988).

20. 961 F.2d at 1544.
21. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(3) (1988).

22. 961 F.2d at 1544-45.
23. Id. at 1546.
24. Id.at 1545.
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manager. The trial court rejected this testimony because the witness was
not personally involved in the addressing, stamping, and mailing of the
notices.2 5 Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized that "unsupported
conclusory statements . . .based on [an] assumption of how mail was
handled. . ." is not sufficient to raise the presumption, it noted that ap-

pellant's evidence was much more specific than this.2 Even though the
witness did not have first-hand knowledge that the notices had been
mailed, he testified in detail about appellant's specific procedures for
handling this type of notice.2 7 This, the Eleventh Circuit held, was sufficient to establish the elements of the presumption 2 8
V.

RULE

402.

RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE

In the Eleventh Circuit, evidence that a criminal defendant fled authorities is relevant to demonstrate guilt.2 In United States v. Blakey,"0 however, defendant contended that such evidence was improperly admitted
because his flight from authorities occurred three years after the charged
offense and at a time when defendant knew he was wanted by authorities
for an unrelated offense.3 1 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, concluding
that the evidence sufficiently demonstrated "consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged.132 The Eleventh Circuit relied on several factors. First, and perhaps the weakest of the factors, defendant was in Atlanta at the time he fled, the city where the charged offense allegedly
occurred. Second, defendant was with an alleged co-conspirator in the
charged offense at the time of the flight. This co-conspirator had been
convicted for his role in the charged offense and was appealing his conviction. Finally, defendant may have known he had been indicted for the
or that he was being investigated for his participation in
charged offense
3
3

the offense.

25. Id. at 1546.
26.

Id. at 1545.

27.

Id. at 1545-46.

28.

Id. at 1546.

29. United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916
(1987).
30.

960 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1992).

31.

Id. at 1000.

32.

Id. at 1001.

33.

Id.
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RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE

CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of extrinsic acts to prove that
a person's conduct, on the occasion in question, conforms with conduct on
other occasions. For example, evidence of bad character is not admissible
to prove that a defendant, being a disreputable person, is more likely to
have committed the charged offense. Extrinsic act evidence is admissible,
however, ."for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 'of mistake or
34
accident.
An important principle to remember when analyzing the admissibility
of extrinsic act evidence is the necessity to determine first whether the
evidence is being offered for a substantive purpose or to impeach or bolster a witness. If the latter, then the admissibility of the evidence is determined by the rules found in Article VI, principally Rule 608, which
addresses the use of character evidence and evidence of specific incidences of conduct. If, however, the extrinsic act evidence is offered for a
substantive purpose, then its admissibility is governed by the rules found
in Article IV, principally Rule 404(b). 5
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Miller8 is a good
primer on the proper application of Rule 404(b). In Miller defendant contended the district court improperly admitted extrinsic act evidence; the
government responded the evidence was properly admitted to prove identity or modus operandi.87 In a panel decision addressed in a previous survey, a bitterly divided Eleventh Circuit reversed defendant's conviction.3 8
To the author, the panel majority's Rule 404(b) analysis seemed much
more stringent than warranted by previous Eleventh Circuit decisions.
Apparently, the Eleventh Circuit agreed. The court vacated the panel
opinion and sat en -banc to reconsider defendant's contentions."
The en banc court first noted the standard three-part test for evaluating the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence enunciated in United States
v. Beechum.40 First, the extrinsic act evidence must be relevant to an is-

34.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

35.

Prior survey articles discuss in more detail the general principles governing the use

of extrinsic act evidence. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1173 (1991);
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1451, 1455-61 (1991).
36. 959 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 382 (1992).
37. 959 F.2d at 1539.
38.

United States v. Miller, 883 F.2d 1540, 1547 (11th Cir. 1989); Marc T. Treadwell,

Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1357, 1361-62 (1990).
39. 923 F.2d 158 (11th Cir. 1991).
40. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
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sue other than the defendant's character.' Second, the prosecution must
prove the defendant committed the extrinsic act.42 The prosecution need

not prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt; proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the extrinsic act is
sufficient. 43 Third, the evidence must not contravene Rule 403, meaning
that the probative value of the extrinsic act evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice." Finally, a district court's
determination to admit extrinsic act evidence, like all evidentiary determinations, is governed by the abuse of discretion standard of review.46
In Miller defendant argued that the extrinsic offense was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be relevant to the issue of identity.' 6 The panel majority reversed defendant's conviction because it
agreed that the necessary degree of similarity was not present. It noted
that when extrinsic act evidence is offered to prove identity, a much
greater degree of similarity between the charged offense and extrinsic defense is required. 4 7 While the en banc court agreed that the similarities
between the offenses must mark the offenses as the handiwork of the accused, its analysis was much less rigorous than the panel majority. It concluded that the offenses were sufficiently similar to satisfy the first prong
of the Beechum test because the extrinsic act evidence was relevant to an
issue other than defendant's character.' 8
Although the intensity of scrutiny under Rule 404(b) has decreased, the
admission of extrinsic act evidence is still subject to some restrictions, as
noted by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Church.4 In Church
the district court admitted a tape recording of a 1979 conversation in
which defendant offered assistance to an informant who professed a desire to hire someone to murder a prosecutor. The pertinent charged offense, conspiracy to commit murder, occurred in 1983 and 1984. The government argued that the taped conversation demonstrated defendant's
willingness to use violence to protect his financial interests and thus, was
relevant to. prove his intent to participate in the alleged conspiracy.5 0
This troubled the Eleventh Circuit, which noted that the distinction be-

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
(1992).
50.

959 F.2d at 1539.
Id. at 1540.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
959 F.2d at 1539-40.
Id. at 1538.
Id.
883 F.2d at 1543.
959 F.2d at 1540.
955 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Coppola v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 233
955 F.2d at 700-01.
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tween intent, a relevant issue, and propensity, a goal prohibited by Rule
404(b), is sometimes difficult to discern.51
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit assumed that the tape recording was
relevant to prove intent and analyzed the tape under the Rule 403 balancing test, the third element of the Beechum test.2 First, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the 1979 conversation was simply not "highly probative" to prove acts committed in 1983 and 1984.1 Moreover, the evidence was highly prejudicial 5 4 Finally, the evidence was cumulative; the
government had other evidence of defendant's intent that was not so
prejudicial. 5 Recognizing that Rule 403 carries a strong presumption in
favor of admissibility and the leniency of the abuse of discretion standard, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless concluded that the district court
erred in admitting evidence of the prior conversation. 6 However, the
court found the error to be harmless. 7
Using mug shots as evidence often implicates Rule 404(b). If a photograph is identifiable as a mug shot, it clearly indicates to a jury that a
defendant has a prior criminal record. Interestingly enough, this issue had
not been definitively addressed by the Eleventh Circuit until its decision
in United States v. Hines.58 In Hines the government tendered, and the
district court admitted, mug shots of the defendant in an effort to bolster
the credibility of a witness who previously identified the defendant from
the mug shots. The government argued on appeal that the mug shots
were relevant to prove identity.", The Eleventh Circuit rejected the government's argument, noting that even if evidence is admissible under a
particular rule of evidence, it may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effectBo Because this was an
issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the court looked to and
adopted the Fifth Circuit's test for the admission of mug shots." First,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id.
Id.
Id.

57. Id.
58. 955 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992). Apparently, the government did not specifically rely
upon Rule 404(b) and the Eleventh Circuit's opinion does not specifically mention Rule
404(b). Nevertheless, discussion of Hines in the context of Rule 404(b) is appropriate because the use of mug shots taken in connection with an unrelated arrest necessarily results
in the admission of extrinsic act evidence.
59. Id. at 1453.
60. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57 (discussing Rule 403 and the third
prong of the Beechum test).
61. 955 F.2d at 1455. United States v. Torres-Flores, 827 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1987).
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the government must have a demonstrable need for the photographs."'
Second, the photographs must not imply that a defendant has a prior
criminal record.68 Third, the government must admit the photographs in
a way that does not draw attention to the fact that the photographs are
mug shots.' Applying this test, the court found the district court improperly admitted the mug shots and, therefore, reversed defendant's
conviction."
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed during the survey period that
not all evidence of other crimes is "extrinsic" to the charged offense. If
the other crimes are "inextricably intertwined" with the charged offense,
then the evidence is not considered extrinsic for purposes of Rule
404(b).6 Of course, this evidence is still subject to the Rule 403 balancing
test."
VII. RULE 405.

METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER

As discussed above, Rule 404(b) broadly, but not totally, prohibits the
use of character evidence for substantive purposes.6 8 In the limited situations in which evidence of character is admissible for substantive purposes, Rule 405 provides the methods for proving character.6 9 However,
one must again be careful to distinguish Rules 404 and 405, which govern
the use of extrinsic act evidence for substantive purposes, from Rule 608,
which governs the use of extrinsic act evidence for impeachment
purposes.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Adair"0 demonstrates that the Federal Rules of Evidence exact a high price for the use
of character evidence. If a party elects to use admissible character evidence, the witnesses attesting to this character are subject to cross-examination about that party's specific conduct pertinent to the character trait
in issue." In Adair the government, prior to trial, informed the court that
if defendant called character witnesses, it intended to question these witnesses about their knowledge of defendant's prior conviction. Defendant
62.
63.
64.

955 F.2d at 1455.
Id.
Id. at 1455-56.

65. Id. at 1456-57.
66. United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61
U.S.L.W. 3479 (1993); United States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
Coppola v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 233 (1992).
67. 971 F.2d at 717; 955 F.2d at 688.
68. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
69. FED. R. EvM 405.

70. 951 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1992).
71. Id. at 319.
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elected not to call these witnesses. On appeal from his conviction, defendant contended that the district court's ruling that the government could
ask character witnesses about his prior conviction forced him not to call
his character witnesses andwas erroneous. 7' The Eleventh Circuit held
that if a witness testifies about a defendant's good character, then the
prosecution can ask that witness "have you heard" questions. 78 Thus, the
government properly could have asked defendant's
character witnesses if
74
they had heard of defendant's prior conviction.
VIII. RULE 501. PRIVILEGES
The Federal Rules of Evidence make no effort to formulate rules recognizing and defining various evidentiary privileges, and if a claim or defense is based upon state law, applicable privileges will be determined by
that state's law. This rule works well, for example, in diversity cases in
which all claims are based upon state law, however, it is much more difficult when some claims are based on state law and other claims are based
on federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed such a situation in Hancock v. Hobbs 7 6
a section 1983 action with pendent state law claims. Appellant contended
that the district court admitted evidence of her psychiatric treatment in
violation of a privilege created by Georgia law. 7 The Eleventh Circuit
noted, however, that federal common law does not recognize a psychiatric
patient privilege.7 Thus, while appellant's psychiatric treatment might
have been privileged under Georgia law, it was not protected by federal
law. Unfortunately, "Rule 501 is not clear as to which rule of decision
should be followed when the federal and state laws of privilege are in
conflict. '7 1 Other circuits that have considered the issue, the court continued, have held that the federal law of privilege governs even though the
evidence in question is relevant to a pendent state claim.7 ' The Eleventh
Circuit found this authority persuasive and held "the federal law of privilege provides the rule of decision in a civil proceeding where the court's
jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question, even if the witness-testi72.
73.
74.
heard"
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 38 MERCER L. REv. 1253, 1261 (1987).
The prosecution must, of course, have a good faith factual basis for its "have you
questions. 951 F.2d at 319.
967 F.2d 462 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 466; O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21 (1982).
967 F.2d at 466.
Id.
Id. at 466-67.
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mony is relevant to a pendent state law count which may be controlled by
a contrary state law of privilege." 80
The misleadingly named "last link" exception to the attorney/client
privilege continues to receive considerable attention from the Eleventh
Circuit. During the present survey period, the Eleventh Circuit appeared
to revert to its previous course, a course that may eventually lead to the
abolition of the last link exception. To understand the status of the last
link exception in the Eleventh Circuit, it is helpful to review briefly the
exception's history. Generally, the identity of a client or fee information
is not protected by the attorney/client privilege. 1 The last link exception,
which was conceived by the Ninth Circuit in Baird v.Koerner5 and
adopted by the Fifth Circuit prior to the split of the Fifth Circuit in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones) ' protects fee and identity information
from disclosure in certain narrow circumstances. "
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin),85 the Eleventh Circuit carefully examined the last link exception and concluded that the test for
determining whether a client's identity or fee information is privileged is
not whether the information would be incriminating, as some courts have
suggested, but rather is whether the disclosure of this information would
necessarily result in the disclosure of privileged information." In a concurring opinion in Rabin, Chief Judge Tjoflat urged the abolition of the
last link exception because of "its inherent inconsistency with the crime/
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. 87 When the Ninth Circuit decided Baird, Chief Judge Tjoflat argued the crime-fraud exception
excluded only communications concerning future criminal or fraudulent
conduct from the protection of the attorney/client privilege. 8 According
to Chief Judge Tjoflat, however, the crime-fraud exception now is much
broader and includes, in proper circumstances, communications with an
attorney intended to conceal evidence of prior misconduct.8 9 Thus, the
identity of a client could never be privileged if the client retained the
attorney in an effort to conceal a past crime, which is what happened in
80.
81.
1982).
82.
83.
1981)

Id. at 467.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, David R. Damore, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir.
279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960).
517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975). In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.
(en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the for-

mer Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
84. 517 F.2d at 672.
85. 896 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1990).
86. Id. at 1273.
87. Id. at 1279 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
88. Id. at 1280 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
89.

Id. (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
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Baird. Consequently, Chief Judge Tjoflat argued, a court today considering a situation similar to that in Baird would reach a result different than
that reached in Baird." Chief Judge Tjofiat urged the Eleventh Circuit to
sit en banc and "take a careful and critical look at [the] ill-conceived [last
link] doctrine." 91
Notwithstanding Rabin and in particular Chief Judge Tjoflat's concurrence, the following year the Eleventh Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (G.J. 90-2),92 reached a result that simply cannot be reconciled
with Rabin. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the government's argument in
G.J. 90-2 that revelation of a client's identity would not disclose privileged information as "disingenuous" and, thus, would not fall within the
ambit of the last link exception." In G.J. 90-2, the Eleventh Circuit
seemed to hold that because the client's identity would be incriminating,
4
this alone was sufficient to make it privileged.'
During the present survey period, the Eleventh Circuit's last link exception decisions seemed more in line with the decision in Rabin. In
United States v. Leventhal," the Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion delivered by a panel that included Chief Judge Tjoflat, held that the
last link exception applies only when disclosure of nonprivileged attorney/client communications would also reveal privileged information." In
a footnote, the court noted that "[m]odern expansion of the crime-fraud
exception

. . .

threatens the continued vitality of the last link doctrine." '

Similarly, in In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386,8 the Eleventh Circuit held that the last link exception prevented disclosure of a client's
identity only when the revelation of the identity would reveal the privileged motive for the client to seek legal advice."
Perhaps, as Chief Judge Tjoflat suggested, the Eleventh Circuit should
sit en banc to decide definitively the status of the last link exception.
However, it would seem safe to say that the broad interpretation applied
by the Eleventh Circuit in C.J. 90-2 is no longer valid law in the Eleventh
Circuit.
One can safely assume that few lawyers will ever encounter the speech
or debate privilege extended to members of Congress. 0 For those inter90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1281 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 1283 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
946 F.2d 746 (l1th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 748.

94. Id.
95. 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1992).

96. Id. at 941.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 940 n.10.
969 F.2d 995 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 999.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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ested in this privilege, however, the Eleventh Circuit's lengthy opinion in
United States v. Swindall'0 ' will be of great interest. To most practitioners the practical utility of this privilege is virtually nil. Since the practicle
utility of the privilege to this author is even more nil, this survey will only
acknowledge this significant decision.
IX.

RULE

608.

EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS

Rule 608(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of specific instances of
conduct to impeach the general credibility of a witness. 10 It does not,
however, prohibit the admission of such evidence to impeach a witness'
specific testimony as to a material fact. 10 3 The Eleventh Circuit's decision
in United States v. Wright 0 4 provides a clear illustration of the proper
application of Rule 608(b).
In Wright the government's chief witness denied on cross examination
any involvement in two prior burglaries. Defendants subsequently sought
to call a witness who would testify that the government's witness admitted his involvement.'0 1 The Eleventh Circuit held that this testimony
constituted extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of bad conduct offered to undermine the general credibility of a witness and, therefore, fell
squarely within Rule 608(b).10 Defendants argued that the proffered testimony was material because another witness had testified that the government's witness was a first time' offender, and the evidence of the prior
burglaries rebutted the government witness' testimony that he was instructed by one of the defendants how to commit the charged offense."'
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting only that the evidence did not contradict the government's witness' testimony.'10
X.

RULE

609.

IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME

0 ' defendant contended the district
In United States v. Pritchard,'
court erred when it permitted the government to use a thirteen year old

101.
102.
103.
sion of

971 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1992).
FED. R. EVWD. 608(b).
See, e.g., United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979). For a fuller discusRule 608(b), see Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1173, 1183-84

(1992).

104. 968 F.2d 1167 (11th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 1169.
106. Id. at 1170.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
973 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1992).
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conviction to impeach his general credibility.1 " Specifically, defendant argued the admission of this evidence contravened Rule 609(b), which prohibits the admission of a conviction more than ten years old, "unless the
court determines . . . that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect." ' In Pritchardthe government faced an uphill struggle because the Eleventh Circuit recognizes a strong presumption against
the use of convictions over ten years old.1 ' Relying upon a decision from
the Sixth Circuit, however,113 the Eleventh Circuit held the district court
properly considered the factors pertinent to the determination of whether
such a conviction should be admitted and did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted evidence of the conviction. 14 First, the Eleventh Circuit
noted, the central issue in the case was credibility-whether the jury
should believe defendant's testimony or the testimony of his accomplice
who testified on behalf of the government.11 ' The criminal record of the
accomplice had been admitted into evidence and this made defendant's
criminal record particularly significant. 116 Second, the government's need
for the impeaching evidence was great and this militated in favor of the
admission of the conviction.1 Finally, the court noted the prior conviction, although somewhat similar to the charged offense, was not so similar
that a jury would consider it evidence defendant had committed the
charged offense (a conclusion prohibited by Rule 404(b)). 1'
XI.

RULE

611.

MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION AND PRESENTATION

Rule 611(b) permits the cross examination of a witness on "matters affecting the credibility of the witness."'1' District courts retain, however,
broad discretion to determine the permissible scope of cross examination.12 0 This discretion, as illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
United States v. Lankford,12 1 is not unlimited.
110. Id. at 907.
111. FED. R. Evm. 609(b). It should be emphasized that Rule 609 applies only to convictions offered to impeach general credibility and does not apply to convictions admitted to
contradict a defendant's material testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Vigliatura, 878 F.2d
1346 (11th Cir. 1989).
112. 973 F.2d at 908.
113. United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1990).
114. 973 F.2d at 909.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. FED. R. EviD. 611(b).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990).
121. 955 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1992).
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In Lankford defendant, a former sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia, was
convicted of extortion and filing false income tax returns. The charges
stemmed from a series of alleged payments to defendant by the witness,
Jack LeCroy, and the government's case largely rested on LeCroy's testimony. 2 ' Although the district court allowed extensive examination of LeCroy, including examination about the grant of immunity to LeCroy in
exchange for his cooperation with the government, it refused to allow defendant to question LeCroy about the unrelated arrest of LeCroy's sons
by state authorities on charges of possession with intent to distribute
marijuana.'
While acknowledging the district court's broad authority to limit cross
examination, the Eleventh Circuit noted this authority is not as extensive
when a criminal defendant questions a witness testifying against the defendant.12 4 In this situation, the court must allow questioning that would
permit "a jury to adequately assess the witness' credibility .

. . .,,s

The

Eleventh Circuit concluded the arrest of his sons may have provided LeCroy with a motive to testify falsely to protect his sons."", The court cited
no evidence in the record of such a motive and appeared concerned that
LeCroy's sons already had pleaded guilty to the state charges and were on
probation at the time of defendant's trial.1 7 Because the prosecution of
the sons was over, certainly one could question how this incident could
have provided LeCroy with a motive to lie about his dealings with defendant. To overcome this problem, the Eleventh Circuit, in a footnote,
noted it is "common knowledge" that state and federal law enforcement
officers worked closely together and that it is not "unusual" for federal
officers to pursue charges in federal court even though the state charges
12
have been resolved.
In dissent, District Court Judge Walter E. Hoffman scoffed at the suggestion LeCroy's testimony could have been influenced by his sons' arrest,
noting the lack of "one scintilla of evidence" to support this conclusion. '2
Moreover, Judge Hoffman argued the "majority's attempts to raise the
specter of 'joint task forces' between federal and state authorities is simply unbelievable in a case of this nature."1 0 Judge Hoffman concluded
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1548-49.
Id. at 1548.
Id.
Id. at 1548-49.
Id. at 1549 n.7.
Id. at 1549 n.8.
Id. at 1555 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
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the district court did not abuse its discretion and, even if it did, the error
was harmless.3 1
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Williams 32 perhaps provides a clearer example of improper limitations on a defendant's
right of cross examination. In Williams the district court did not permit
defendant to establish that an informant received almost $450,000 in reward money.1"" The Eleventh Circuit, clearly incensed at the amount of
this payment, reversed defendant's conviction, concluding a defendant is
entitled to question a witness about possible motivations.3 4 Responding
to the government's argument that the introduction of this evidence
would be prejudicial, the court declared:
If the amount paid an informant is felt by the government to be too
prejudicial for an American jury to hear about, the solution is for the
government to make reasonable payments; the solution is not for the
court to rule the evidence irrelevant as too prejudicial. We have never
approved of a rule which makes small payments to informants admissible, but large, outrageous payments inadmissible. The large and outrageous payments may be just the kind that are of the most help to the
jury in arriving at the truth.' 3 '
Enough said.
XII. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 704. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE

Rule 704(a) provides that opinion testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."'3
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit frequently struggles with the issue of
whether experts should be permitted to opine on such questions as
whether a party was negligent or whether a.collision was an accident, and
the court has sometimes reached arguably conflicting results. 37 This issue
again surfaced in United States v.Myers.'3 8 In Myers two witnesses with
law enforcement backgrounds testified that defendant, also a law enforcement officer, used unreasonable 'and unjustified force against plaintiff.' 3'
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1563 (Hoffman, J.,dissenting).
954 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
Id.

136.

FED. R. Evm. 704.

137. See discussion of these issues in Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERcER L.Rzv.
1291, 1311-12 (1989); Marc T.Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERcER L. REv. 1357, 1370 (1990);
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REv. 1451, 1469-70 (1991).
138. 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992).

139. Id. at 1576.
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The Eleventh Circuit 'agreed that a witness invades the province of the
jury when testifying that force was unreasonable or unjustified, but nevertheless held that an expert witness can, testify as to the prevailing standards in the field of law enforcement. 14 0 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that "in light of the questioning and answers given," the opinions
were
"
properly framed in accordance with prevailing police standards. "I
Rule 704(b) prohibits an expert in a criminal, case from stating an opinion about whether defendant did or did not have the mental state constituting an element of the crime or a defense to the crime. 42 As discussed
in previous surveys, this provision has proved difficult to apply.4 3 Although the majority opinion in United States v. Lankford " " does not
mention Rule 704(b), it no doubt will add to the difficulties of applying
Rule 704(b).
In Lank ford the district court excluded defendant's proffered expert
testimony that he reasonably could have believed that a $1,500 check was
a gift rather than taxable income. The majority, noting defendant was
charged with willfully filing a false income tax return, concluded
"[elxpert testimony of the reasonableness of Lankford's belief would be
highly relevant to the assessment of whether Lankford, willfully violated
the tax laws.' ' 4 5 In a detailed dissent partially relying on Rule 704, Senior
District Court Judge Walter E. Hoffman vigorously disputed the majority's conclusion. Judge Hoffman argued that defendant's expert's testimony, shorn of its frills, amounted to nothing more than a pronouncement that defendant did not have the requisite mental state to violate the
law. Judge Hoffman worried the "effect of today's decision will be t.o open
the door in cases not involving a disease of the mind to expert testimony
as to what a person was thinking at a certain point in time." 4 Whether
or not this will be the effect of Lankford, it no doubt will lead criminal
defendants to at least attempt to use such expert testimony.

XIII.

ARTICLE

VIII. HEARSAY

Given the Eleventh Circuit's large criminal case load, a survey of its
decisions concerning hearsay must open with a discussion of the seem140.

Id. at 1577.

141. Id.
142. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
143.

See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1259, 1276-78 (1988);

Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1291, 1309-11 (1989); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1357, 1370 (1990); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L.
REV. 1451, 1469-70 (1991).

144. 955 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1992).
145. Id. at 1551.
146. Id. at 1562.

1226

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

ingly,inherent conflict between the use of hearsay evidence in criminal
cases and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.14 7 If the out
of court statement of an unavailable declarant is admitted into evidence,
the defendant will not "be confronted with the witnesses against him."" 8
For a number of years, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Ohio v.
Roberts 4 9 was understood to hold the Sixth Amendment imposed two
limitations. on the use of hearsay evidence. 1" First, hearsay evidence is
not admissible unless the prosecution proves the declarant is unavailable.'5' Second, the hearsay statement must bear "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' "1,2 In United States v. Inadi,1" however, the Supreme Court
concluded Roberts does not stand for the proposition that "no out-ofcourt statement can be introduced. . without a showing that the declarant is unavailable." 154 In Inadi the Court held the confrontation clause
does not require a showing of unavailability as a prerequisite to the admission of a co-conspirator statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 15 The
Supreme Court again visited this issue in Idaho v. Wright.1 " In Wright
the out of court declarant, a child, was admittedly unavailable to testify.
Therefore, the issue became whether the out of court statement satisfied
the reliability requirement of the second prong of the Roberts test. 157 The
decision in Roberts suggested, and the Supreme Court later confirmed,
that the requisite indicia of reliability could be found if the evidence fell
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.'" In Wright the lower court
admitted the out of court statement under Idaho's residual exception to
the hearsay rule, an exception that the Supreme Court concluded was not
sufficiently rooted to establish automatically the requisite reliability.' 9
Therefore, the circumstances surrounding the statement had to be examined to determine if the statement was sufficiently trustworthy. Significantly, the Court noted that the reliability of the statement could not be
established by corroborating evidence, but rather the statement "must
possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness.""'
147.

U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 399-400.
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Id. at 816.
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
497 U.S. at 817.
Id. at 822.
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During the present survey period, the Supreme Court again examined
the conflict between hearsay evidence and the confrontation clause. In
White v.Illinois,161 the state trial court admitted testimony from several
witnesses concerning statements made to them by a child who allegedly
had been sexually molested by defendant. The court admitted the testimony of these witnesses (a babysitter, the child's mother, an investigating
officer, an emergency room nurse, and a doctor) pursuant to Illinois' hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the
course of securing medical treatment. Defendant argued that the
admis162
sion of this evidence violated his right to confront his accuser.
The Supreme Court first rejected the argument of the United States as
amicus curiae that the confrontation clause should be narrowly read to
apply only to a practice common in sixteenth and seventeenth century
England: the use of ex parte affidavits to prove a defendant's guilt.'6"
Thus, the United States argued the confrontation clause should not restrict the admission of hearsay evidence generally but should only apply
to "witnesses against" a defendant.1' The Court summarily rejected this
argument, noting "[shuch a narrow reading of the Confrontation Clause,
which would virtually eliminate its role in restricting the admission of
hearsay testimony, is foreclosed by our prior cases."1 e 6
Turning to defendant's contentions, the Supreme Court first addressed
whether it was necessary to demonstrate the child's unavailability. 66 The
Court acknowledged that its decision in Roberts suggested the confrontation clause generally required the declarant's unavailability be proved.'"
Noting its decision in Inadi, however, the Court concluded that Roberts
stood only for the proposition that a witness' unavailability must be
proven when the out of court statement is admitted pursuant to a hearsay
exception for statements made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.'6 8 In other words, the Roberts' unavailability requirement is now officially restricted to its facts.
The Court then concluded that statements admitted pursuant to hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the
course of receiving medical care do not require a demonstration of a declarant's unavailability."6 ' Such statements are reliable because they are
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id.

169. Id. at 742.
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made in situations that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. The factors which make these statements reliable, spontaneity
and the desire to impart accurate information to facilitate medical treatment, would not be present when a declarant testifies in court.17 0 "To

exclude such probative statements under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause would be the height of wrong-headedness, given that the Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion of the 'integrity of
the fact-finding process.' 171
In a concurring opinion, Justices Thomas and Scalia agreed with the
United States' argument and urged the Court, in an appropriate case, to
reconsider fundamentally the relationship between
the confrontation
17
clause and the admission of hearsay evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the interrelationship between the confrontation clause and the admission of hearsay evidence in United States
v.Accetturo.173 In Accetturo the declarant borrowed and then failed to
repay money to defendants. After being physically threatened, the declarant gave a statement to authorities and began cooperating with their investigation of defendants. The declarant disappeared two days before de-,
fendants' trial began and was found murdered five days later. 7" The
district court admitted his statement pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5), the
residual hearsay exception. However, in determining the trustworthiness
of the declarant's statement, the district court relied upon independent
corroborative evidence,"' a process that defendants contended contravened Idaho v. Wright.'"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the decision in
Wright prohibited the use of independent evidence to evaluate the trustworthiness of hearsay evidence.17 7 The court also acknowledged that the
residual exception to the hearsay rule is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception that would raise a presumption of trustworthiness.1 78 Thus, the
court determined whether the circumstances surrounding the statement,
rather than the corroborative evidence relied upon by the district court,
were sufficient to establish the requisite reliability of the statement. 7 9'
The court found that it was. 80
170. Id.
171. Id. at 743 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)).
172. Id. at 748 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).

173. 966 F.2d 631 (llth Cir. 1992).
174. Id. at 632.
175. Id. at 633.
176. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
177. 966 F.2d at 634.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 636.
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The statement was in the declarant's own handwriting, it was made
voluntarily, and it was given to law enforcement authorities, whom the
declarant knew would likely investigate his statements. In addition, the
declarant, afer giving the statement, agreed to allow his conversations
with defendants to be recorded. Also, the statement was in narrative form
and, thus, the declarant was not responding to leading questions. The declarant was the victim of the defendant's alleged crimes and, therefore,
had ample opportunity to witness the events in his statement. Finally,
the statement was made while the events were fresh in the declarant's
mind. Most important to the Eleventh Circuit, the declarant feared for
his life and, therefore, had no incentive to fabricate a story that would
only lead to further investigation by authorities. 81 Considering these factors, the court concluded that "the indicia of reliability are strong enough
to overcome the presumption against the admissibility of hearsay evidence pursuant to a residual hearsay exception." 82
The Federal Rules of Evidence's version of the business records exception to the rule against hearsay is found in Rule 803(6). In United States
u. Jacoby,183 the 'Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether unusual
business activity can fall. within the business records exception.' 8 In
Jacoby, a criminal prosecution arising from a savings and loan failure, the
district court admitted a memorandum prepared by a real estate attorney. In his memorandum to the file, the attorney recounted in some detail
a telephone conversation with one of the defendants in which the defendant asked him to close several loans notwithstanding apparent irregularities. The attorney did not testify at trial and the government established
the foundation for the admission of the evidence through the attorney's
secretary and a paralegal.' ss The district court did not admit the memorandum under Rule 803(6) because of its concern that the memorandum
was "not a routine type of thing."' 8 The court did, however, admit the
memorandum under Rule 804(b)(5), the residual exception. 8 "
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit chose not to analyze the memorandum
under Rule 804(b)(5) but rather proceeded to determine whether the
memorandum was an admissible business record.18 s Defendant contended
181. Id. at 635.
182. Id. at 636.
183. 955 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1992).
184. Id. at 1535.
185. Id. at 1534-35.
186. Id. at 1535.
187. Id.
188. Id. The reason why the court did not rely upon Rule 804(b)(5) merits note. Defendant contended that the admission of the out of court statement violated his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him. The limitations of the use of hearsay evidence
in criminal prosecutions is discussed above and, as noted, hearsay evidence meets the re-
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the memorandum could not be a business record because it did not record
a routine event.189 The Eleventh Circuit responded that because a document is not routine does not necessarily mean it cannot be within the
business records exception.'" Rather, nonroutine records may still be admissible if they otherwise meet the requirements of Rule 803(6), and the
trial court finds them to be sufficiently trustworthy.191 The Eleventh Circuit also found that while the memorandum recorded an unusual event, it
was the attorney's regular practice to prepare such memoranda to document unusual events.91 Therefore, the district court properly admitted
19
the memorandum albeit for reasons different than originally stated. 1
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that statements by co-conspirators are not
hearsay.'" In previous surveys, the author has speculated that the Supreme Court's decision in Bourjaily v. United Statesss which substantially relaxed the test for the admission of co-conspirator statements, was
responsible for the fact that Rule 801(b)(2)(E) did not figure prominently
in appeals to the Eleventh Circuit. Indeed, because the Eleventh Circuit
now applies a very liberal standard for the admission of co-conspirator
statements, the likelihood of reversal of a conviction because of improper
admission of such a statement has been reduced considerably. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Blakey'9s demonstrates, however, that this liberal standard has some limitations.
In Blakey the district court admitted the statement of a co-conspirator
implicating defendant. A bank officer testified that the co-conspirator,
when questioned about the authenticity of a check, said that defendant
gave him the check. The evidence sufficiently established that both defendant and the co-conspirator were members of the conspiracy.197 The
question, however, was whether the statement was made in furtherance of
the conspiracy. While the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that statements
concealing a conspiracy are considered to be made in furtherance of the
conspiracy, it noted statements that simply shift the blame from one coconspirator to another are not considered to have been made to advance
quirements of the confrontation clause if it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.

Residual exceptions are not considered to be sufficiently firmly rooted. Business records ex-

ceptions are, however, and for this reason the Eleventh Circuit evaluated the memorandum
under the requirements of Rule 803(6). 955 F.2d at 1535-38.
189. 955 F.2d at 1535.

190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 1537.
Id.
Id. at 1536.

194. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E).
195. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
196. 960 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1992).
197. Id. at 998.
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any objective of the conspiracy. 1 "8 Thus, statements that the Eleventh
Circuit termed "spill the beans" statements are not admissible under the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.1 99 After examining the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the co-conspirator's statement was
simply an effort to shift the blame to defendant and, therefore, was not
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 2 "
XIV.

RULE

1002.

REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINAL

The Federal Rules' version of the best evidence rule is found in Rule
1002 that simply provides "to prove the content of a writing, recording or
1 Although the best
photograph, the original. . . is required ....,0
evidence rule is often seized as the basis for 'any objection to the use of a
copy of a document, its actual application is very narrow, as demon02
strated by the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Howard.
In Howard a government witness who taped a conversation between defendant and an informant testified about the taped conversation. The district court first allowed the tape to be played for the jury, but the explanatory testimony was necessary because a portion of the tape was
203
inaudible. Defendant contended this violated the best evidence rule.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the witness' testimony
was not offered to prove the content of the tapes but rather to prove what
he heard defendant say.204 fn the Eleventh Circuit's view, the witness'

testimony was simply a "testimonial recollection of the conversation
"2"
Thus, because the testimony was admitted to prove the contents of the conversation rather than the contents of the tape, the best
206
evidence rule did not apply.

198. Id.

199. Id.
200. Id. at 999. Notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's reversal of defendant's conviction in Blakey, the court continues to apply a very liberal standard for the admission of the
coconspirator statements. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 976 F.2d 666 (11th Cir.

1992).
201. FED. R. EvID. 1002.
202. 953 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1992).
203. Id. at 612.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206.

Id. at 613.

